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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
which the judgment is based are false; or upon the grounds that
the court erred in determining the law or facts of the original
action. Why, then, should the courts allow a collateral attack on
the ground that there was a lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter in the original action ?" In both instances the attacking
party has had his day in court and has presumably had ample op-
portunity to raise all of his defenses. Established principles de-
signed to protect the rights of parties and govern the orderly
judicial process indicate that the rule that a judgment rendered
by a court without jurisdiction of the subject matter is wholly
void and subject to collateral attack should be struck down once
and for all."
A. F. SLAIGHT
"Of course, if the court rendering the original judgment was barred by
the Constitution or by the supreme law of the land from assuming juris-
diction of the action, then a collateral attack may be permissible and
necessary, depending upon the circumstances, e. g., Pennoyer v. Neff
(1877), 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565; supra, note 32.42To bring about this desired result it would require, in addition to an
overruling of the earlier decisions, legislative acton. In this connection,
see R. C. M. 1947, § § 93-1001-20, 93-1001-28 and 93-1001-29.
VENUE OF CONTRACTS ACTIONS IN MONTANA
In 1944 the Hardenburgh' case overturned settled law in
Montana on the fundamental procedural question of the place of
trial of actions on contracts. That the question is one which is
still very much alive is evidenced by the recent decision of Fraser
v. Clark,' wherein one of the dissenting justices said:
"Nothing said in the majority opinion tends to re-
duce the confusion that exists on the subject. It merely
disposes of the present controversy and in my judgment
lends no help to the lawyer who may find himself con-
fronted with questions of venue in the future."
Part I of this comment is a survey of the salient Montana
cases on this subject of venue of contract actions, including the
Hardenburgh and Fraser cases. Part II is an appraisal of the
present state of Montana law on the matter. Part III is a critique
of what would seem to be the present rule. Suggestions for
change of the present rule are made in part IV.
'Hardenburgh, v. Hardenburgh (1944) 115 Mont. 469, 146 P.(2d) 151.
2(1954) ...... Mont...... 273 P.(2d) 105.
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I.
Chapter 29 of Title 93 of the Montana Code' regulates the
place of trial of civil actions, subject to the pertinent sections of
the Montana Constitution.' Sections 93-2901 to 93-2903 enumer-
ate certain types of actions and provide specifically the county
of trial thereof. Section 93-2904 provides for "all other cases,"
as follows:
"In all other cases the action shall be tried in the
county in which the defendants, or any of them, may
reside at the commencement of the action, or where the
plaintiff resides, and the defendants, or any of them,
may be found; or, if none of the defendants reside in the
state, or, if residing in the state, the county in which
they so reside be unknown to the plaintiff, the same may
designate in his complaint; and if any defendant or de-
fendants may be about to depart from the state, such
action may be tried in any county where either of the
parties may reside, or service be had. Actions upon con-
tracts may be tried in the county in which the contract
was to be performed, and actions for torts in the county
where the tort was committed; subject, however, to the
power of the court to change the place of trial as pro-
vided in this code."
In examining the Montana cases concerning venue of con-
tract actions, it is helpful to observe three important questions
which present themselves throughout: Is there but one proper
county for the trial of such actions, or more than one? Which
contracts are within the purview of the second sentence of Sec-
tion 93-2904 ? And upon whom is the burden of proof in regard
to maintaining or changing the venue?
The first landmark case in Montana on this question was
State ex rel. Interstate Lumber Company v. District Court.!
Plaintiff Interstate Lumber Company sued in Lewis and Clark
County for lumber sold and delivered. The defendant demurred,
and also moved for a change of venue to Silver Bow County on
the ground he was a resident there and had been served there.
The plaintiff resisted the motion on the grounds that the con-
tract was made in Lewis and Clark County and was to be per-
formed there, and that the lumber was sold and delivered in
Lewis County and was used in the erection of a building there.
In a unanimous decision, the Court held for the plaintiff,
saying that the second sentence of Section 93-2904 excepts actions
3R.C.M. 1947.
'Mont. Const. Art. VIII, § 11.
'(1918) 54 Mont. 602, 172 P. 1030.
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on tort and contract from the application of the general pro-
visions of the first sentence and requires venue for those actions
to be determined ". . . by considerations wholly apart from the
residence or whereabouts of the defendant." The Court then
held that the auxiliary "may" in the second sentence has no
significance used as a permisive auxiliary; that, however, if
given the effect of "must", it becomes harmonious with the rest
of the section, and expresses legislative intent to except those two
classes of cases from the general statement in the first sentence.
The decision overruled Wallace v. Owsley,' McDannell v. Col-
lins,' and Bond v. Hurd,' as based upon California decisions which
were founded on a California statute not then having a provision
similar to the second sentence of Montana's Section 93-2904. It
was further said that Bond v. Hurd was clearly erroneous in
limiting the application of the second sentence to express con-
tracts, since the word "contract" was not qualified in the code
provision.
The decision seems to have tacity assumed there could be but
one proper county for trial, when setting out to render the second
sentence "meaningful." And it perhaps impliedly approved of
the use of the ordinary rules of contract interpretation when it
held that "may " means "must", since it now became more im-
perative to find a place of performance
The question of burden of proof, whether upon the plaintiff
to maintain the venue when challenged or upon the defendant
when moving for a change, was not expressly decided until the
later case of Courtney v. Gordon,"° wherein it was held that the
burden was upon the defendant.
The Interstate Lumber Company case was followed by a
long line of decisions.' These decisions applied the ordinary
rules for the interpretation of contracts in determining where
the contract was to be performed, including the "tender rule,"'
"(1891) 11 Mont. 219, 27 P. 790.
'(1897) 19 Mont. 372, 48 P. 549.
'(1904) 31 Mont. 314, 78 P. 579, 3 Am. Cas. 566.
'See note 27, inrfra. Also, by citing with approval Oels v. Helena and Liv-
ingston Smelting and Reduction Co., (1891) 10 Mont. 524, 26 P. 1000,
wherein the place of performance of the contract was found by implica-
tion, the Court perhaps gave its blessing to the use of such interpretive
rules.
"(1925) 74 Mont. 408, 241 P. 233.
"See notes 17 and 18, Horkan, The Place of Trial of Contract and Tort
Actions Under the Montana Venue Statutes, 10 MONT. L. Rgv. 83 (1949).
"See, for example, State ex rel. Coburn v. District Court (1910) 41 Mont.
84, 108 P. 144, a pre-Interstate case applying the tender rule, which is
often cited in thel later cases. Also, see R.C.M. 1947, Title 58, Ch. 4.
3
McNamer: Venue of Contracts Actions in Montana
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1955
NOTES AND COMMENT
when the intent of the parties could not be clearly ascertained
from the contract itself.
The Hardenburgh v. Hardenburghe decision apparently at-
tempted to overrule the Interstate Lumber Company case. Hard-
enburgh was an action in Richland County, by the plaintiffs there
residing, for the breach of a written contract for the sale of the
plaintiffs' business. The defendant moved for a change of venue
to Missoula County, alleging that as his residence, and that Mis-
soula was the place of contracting and the place of performance.
The plaintiffs contended that Richland County was the place of
performance.
The majority opinion, written by Mr. Justice Adair, held for
the defendant, stating that: the general rule is that all actions
other than specifically provided for in Sections 93-2901 to 93,2903
shall be tried in the county wherein the defendant resided at the
commencement of the action; that the provisions of the first sen-
tence of Section 93-2904 apply to all actions on contracts and
torts, but that such provisions are not exclusive, for tort actions
may also be tried in the county where the tort was committed,
and contract actions in the county where the contract was to be
performed, provided that the contract sued upon indicates, either
in terms or by necessary implication therefrom a particular coun-
ty in which it was to be performed; that the "may" of the second
sentence means just that, the contract clause not having been
placed ahead of the general provision; that the tender rule is not
applicable, requiring too many assumptions; and that the plain-
tiff must clearly show the facts necessary to bring the case within
the exception to the genral rule. Concluding that Missoula was
the county in which the contract was to be performed, the opin-
ion said that, however, since Missoula was also the county of the
defendant's residence, venue was controlled by the rule rather
than the exception.
Mr. Justice Anderson concurred. Mr. Justice Morris said,
"I do not concur in all that is said in the opinion by Mr. Justice
Adair, but I concur in the result." Mr. Chief Justice Johnson
and Mr. Justice Erickson dissented.
The decision seemed to establish more than one proper coun-
ty for the trial of a contract action; to set up the rule that the
contract clause of the venue statute applies only to express con-
tracts which, in terms or by necessary implication therefrom,
indicate the place of performance; and to put the burden on the
"Supra, note 1.
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plaintiff to avail himself of this "exception" to the general pro-
visions of the first sentence.
The first case to test the effect of the Hardenburgh decision
was Johnson v. Ogle," which case developed another split in the
court. That was an action in Lake County for services rendered
by the plaintiff in the sale of real property situated in Lake
County, venue being laid on the allegation the contract was to be
performed in that county. The defendant moved for change of
venue to Stillwater County, his alleged residence.
The Court held the burden to be upon the party moving for
the change of venue to disclose facts entitling him to the change,
and that the defendant had not so carried the burden. Mr. Jus-
tice Morris wrote the majority opinion, which was concurred in
by Mr. Chief Justice Johnson and Mr. Justice Cheadle, and he
made use of the opportunity to state that in the Hardenburgh
case he had concurred in the result only, and that in his opinion
the Interstate Lumber Co. case remained the leading case on the
subject, and correctly construed Section 93,2904 as to the question
of venue of contract actions.
Mr. Justice Adair, concurring specially, said that the plain-
tiff, in the case sub judice, had made a proper showing; that the
reference by the majority to the Hardenburgh decision was
gratuitous; and that "may" still meant " C may." I
It thus appears that the burden of proof was shifted back
to the party movant, that the majority intended to carry forward
the law of the Interstate case, and that there was no discussion,
in either the majority or the concurring opinions, of the rule of
"express terms or necessary implication."
The most recent case on this subject was Fraser v. Clark,'
which again was a 3 to 2 decision. That was a suit in Yellowstone
County for the down payment and the interest on the purchase
price under a contract for the sale of ranch land situated in
Fergus County. The plaintiffs were residents of Yellowstone
County, and the defendants were residents of Fergus County,
and were served there.
The defendants, in their affidavit in support of motion for
change of venue, contended that the contract did not include all
the, lands originally agreed to be conveyed, that the contract was
surrendered by the defendants' attorney without the plaintiffs
having showed good title to the lands, and that the plaintiffs' con-
version of certain earnest money was unlawful.
14(1945) 117 Mont. 419, 159 P. (2d) 337.
'Supra, note 2.
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The plaintiffs' affidavit stated that the contract sued upon
did not designate the place of payment, and that the defendants
had not sought out the plaintiffs for the purpose of making pay-
ment.
The Court held for the defendants, the majority opinion
again being written by Mr. Chief Justice Adair. It stated that
the Montana statutes provide for the application either of the
general rule of trial at the defendant's residence or of certain
exceptions, those exceptions being there enumerated. It was said
that if the instant case did not come within one of the exceptions
then the general rule applied; and therefore Fergus County, the
residence of the defendants would be the proper county for the
trial of the action. The Court quite summarily ruled out the ap-
plication of the second sentence of Section 93-2904, saying that
the plaintiffs' affidavit stated the place of payment was not
designated in the contract.'
Quoted with approval was the California case of Brown v.
Happy Valley Fruit Growers, wherein it was said:
"The right of a defendant to have an action brought
against him tried in the county in which he has his resi-
dence is an ancient and valuable right, which has always
been safeguarded, by statute and is supported by a long
line of judicial decisions.""
The Fraser opinion went on to state that the early Montana de-
cisions uniformly held that the exception provided for in the sec-
ond sentence of Section 93-2904 applies only to a) actions on ex-
press contracts b) wherein the contract discloses upon its face
that it was to be performed in a particular county other than
that of the defendant's residence, and that in all other cases the
proper place of trial is regulated by the provisions of the first
sentence. The Court then expressly disapproved of the construc-
tion given by the Interstate Lumber Co. case to the second sen-
tence of Section 93-2904, and of its overruling of prior decisions.
Justices Angstman and Anderson dissented.'
There seem to have been two grounds for the decision: the
first, that the general rule of trial at the defendant's residence
applied, since the contract did not in terms designate the place
'It is the writer's view that the discussion of obligations to be met by
the plaintiff, p. 119 (273 P. 2d), headnote 16, is in reference to the sec-
ond ground for the decision, discussed infra, note 19.
'(1929) 206 Cal. 515, 521, 274, P. 977, 979.
'Justice Anderson cited the earlier comment, Horkan, The Place of Trial
of Contract and Tort Actions Under the Montana Venue Statutes, 10
MONT. L. REv. 83.
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for performance ; the second, that the "subject of the action" was
in Fergus County.
And so, the Fraser case is the latest pronouncement of the
Montana Supreme Court on a procedural question which has gone
up to that court three times in the last ten years. Does it settle
the question?
Let us look at the Fraser case in terms of the three main
facets of the problem which have shown themselves in this line of
decisions; first, as to the question of whether there is but one, or
more than one, proper county for the trial of a contract action.
Neither the majority nor the dissent discussed the issue expressly.
The majority did not consider Johnson v. Ogle, and the dissent
cited it only on the question of burden of proof. Yet in Johnson
the Court ostensibly invalidated the extensive Hardenburgh opin-
ion on this point. What does the Court now think about the mat-
ter ?
Next, what about burden of proof? The decision is ambigu-
ous as to whether the defendant carried a burden to make a show-
ing entitling him to a change of venue, or whether the plaintiff
failed to sustain a burden in maintaining the venue as laid.
"The alternate ground for the decision was that it was an action involv-
ing the title or right to possession of real property. This proposition
was supported in two ways; the first, that the "subject of the action"
was in Fergus County. After quoting Section 93-2901 (R.C.M. 1947),
the opinion concluded that in the case at bar the "subject of the action"
was the plaintiffs' right to the sums in the possession of the defend-
ants' agent in Lewistown, when the plaintiff conveyed title to the land
situated in Fergus County. But, would it not seem clear that the Legis-
lature, in drafting Section 93-2901, intended the phrase, "subject of the
action," to refer to the land itself, and sub-section (1) to refer to actions
involving the recovery of the property itself, rather than the payment
therefor? And, as pointed out by the dissent, the cited case of Heineke
v. Scott would not seem comparable, being an action to remove a cloud
on title. In 3 BANCROFT'S CODE PLEADIN , PRACTICE AND REMEDIES, Ten
Year Supplement, § 981, p. 1805, it is stated that statutes prescribing
venue of actions for the recovery of real property apply only when the
interest in the land is the exclusive subject of the action.
The second basis for this ground of the decision was, since the plain-
tiffs were to perform certain title obligations, and since all transactions
affecting the title to real property are required, by statute, to be re-
corded in that county, therefore the action was brought into one of the
exceptions in the venue code pertaining to real property, although it was
not specified which. (See op. cit. at P. 119, headnote 16.) It is diffi-
cult for the writer to understand this line of reasoning, unless conveni-
ence of trial or witnesses was the concern, in which event the defend-
ants could have moved the trial court's discretion after their general
appearance (R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2906).
So, it would seem to the writer that the second ground of the deci-
sion in Fraser v. Clark is involved in some obscurity, and It does not
appear that Mr. Chief Justice Adair himself placed much weight
thereon.
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Finally, have the Montana bench and bar now in their pos-
session a clear and unambiguous statement of a rule concerning
which contracts are in the contemplation of the second sentence
of Section 93-2904? The Hardenburgh opinion cast its rule as to
which contracts are embraced by that sentence both in the form
of requiring the contract to state "in terms" the place of per-
formance' and in the form of requiring the contract to state
"either in terms or by express implication therefrom" the par-
ticular county.' Further, the Court seemingly authorized re-
course to statutes,' to the nature of the contract itself, and to the
facts and circumstances under which it was made.'
But in the Fraser case the Court looked no further after
seeing that the plaintiffs' affidavit admitted the contract did not
designate a place of performance. And the rule was seemingly
limited to contracts which by their express terms indicate the
place of performance.' Does the Court really intend to so limit
the rule ?
The importance of having these questions settled need hardly
be stated. Not only is there the matter of delay and expense to
the litigants concerned in establishing the place of trial of their
actions, but also there is the interest of the courts and of the peo-
ple of the state in the expeditious, efficient administration of jus-
tice. Further, the fact that this procedural question is assignable
error in a case tried on the merits militates for the establishment
of a rule that is certain.
Since the Hardenburgh opinion was concurred in only by Mr.
Justice Anderson, Mr. Justice Morris concurring only in the re-
sult, it would seem clear that it does not constitute a controlling
precedent,' particularly in view of Mr. Justice Morris' clarifica-
tion in Johnson v. Ogle, of his position in the Hardenburgh case."
'0Hardenburgh v. Hardenburgh (1944) 115 Mont. 469, 482, 146 P. (2d)
151, 156, in discussing the Coburn case.
"Hardenburgh v. Hardenburgh (1944) 115 Mont. 469, 488, 146 P.(2d)
151, 158.
-Hardenburgh v. Hardenburgh (1944) 115 Mont. 469, 480, 146 P. (2d)
151,155.
"Hardenburgh v. Hardenburgh (1944) 115 Mont. 469, 479, 146 P.(2d)
151, 154.
"From the state of the report, it is difficult to evaluate the decision in
terms of the asserted contract provision for an escrow at the bank in
Billings, Yellowstone County.
'Franz v. Listug (1937) 105 Mont. 499, 74 P.(2d) 1133; BLACx's LAW OF
JUDTCIAL PRECEDENTS, § 43, p. 135; and see In re Irvine's Estate (1943)
114 Mont. 577, 593, 139 P. (2d) 489, 495, 147 A.L.R. 882, 890.
"BLACK'S LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS, § 35, 102, and case there cited.
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The Johnson case reasserted that Interstate Lumber Co. re-
mained the leading case on the subject, specifically stating that
venue in contract cases is to be determined by considerations whol-
ly apart from the residence or whereabouts of the defendant.
But it is arguable that now Fraser v. Clark has effectively
overruled the Interstate Lumber Co. case as to that interpretation,
despite a certain ambiguity as to exactly which construction of
the . . . "second or concluding sentence of Section 93-2904 . . ."
was being overruled ;-the holding that "may" means "must,"
or. the holding that Wallace v. Owsley, etc., was erroneous in re-
quiring the contract to state in express terms the place of per-
formance. However, as to that, the main consideration in the
Interstate case was whether the second sentence was mandatory,
rather than whether the second sentence embraced only exprss
contracts which on their face indicate the place of performance.
(Indeed, the Court in Interstate seemed not to consider that ele-
ment of the problem.) And so, the Court in Fraser very possibly
intended to overrule Interstate on "may" meaning "must. " This
interpretation is somewhat reinforced by the fact that the Court
cited R.C.M. 1947, Section 19-102, pertaining to the interpreta-
tion of words and phrases in Montana Statutes; by the fact that
the Court's enunciation of a primary right in the defendant to
have an action against him tried at his residence militates against
the Interstate rule, which regards the defendant's residence as
irrelevant; and by the fact that the rule of "express terms" as
laid down in the Fraser decision would seem to be opposed to a
rule making it also mandatory to find the place of performance.'
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that under the rule of
Fraser v. Clark there is more than one proper county for the place
of trial of an action upon a contract.'
As to burden of proof: Since the Court again adopts the
'This argument is, of course, based upon the assumption that any rule
limiting the type of contracts embraced by the contract clause is opposed
to the interpretation of that clause given by the Interstate Lumber Co.
case. This is not a logical necessity, but it appears to the writer an
actual necessity under the Interstate line of cases, wherein it is asked,
not "Is this a contract within the contract exception of Section
..93-2904?", but simply, "Is there a contract involved?"
That is, although it is possible to limit the contracts which are em-
braced by that clause and still provide for but one proper county of trial
thereon, yet from the above discussed cases it would seem that the"may-must" rule under Interstate contemplates no limitation on the type
of contract eligible, and that the Court in imposing such limitation is
therefore impliedly throwing out the "may-must" rule. However, there
is certainly some room for argument that the Court in Fraser did not
consider the question of "may" and "must" seriously in question.
'And, under Shields v. Shields (1943) 115 Mont. 146, 139 P. (2d) 528, it is
error to grant a change of venue from one proper county to another.
9
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position taken in Hardenburgh that the defendant has an "an-
cient and valuable right" to have an action brought against him
tried in the county of his residence, it would seem it would also
prefer the corollary to that right, stated in Hardenburgh, that
the burden is upon the plaintiff to bring himself within the terms
of the "exception."
Yet the Court does not expressly overrule the holding of
Johnson v. Ogle as to this matter; nor are the two decisions, be-
yond reasonable question, inconsistent as to this point. So it must
be concluded that Johnson v. Ogle is still the law as to burden of
proof, the burden being upon the party moving for a change of
venue to disclose the facts which entitle him to the change.
Having ventured that "may" means "may," and that the
burden of proof is on the defendant to effect a change of venue
in a contract action, we now come to the third major aspect of
this venue problem: whether the ordinary rules for contract
interpretation may be used in finding where the contract sued
upon was to be performed; or must the contract be specific as to
that place of performance, and, if so, how specific?
A preliminary question to be looked at is whether-since the
philosophy underlying the Fraser decision and some of the lan-
guage therein closely parallel the same in Hardenburgh, and since
both decisions were written by the same justice-the Harden-
burgh and Fraser cases should be read together to arrive at the
rule under consideration. If so, then we could assume that the
law as expressed by the majority in the Fraser case is a little
more liberal than the language would suggest, that the rule would
at least include "necessary implication." And it would be pos-
sible to go further and state that the rule would also include look-
ing to the circumstances and the pertinent code provisions, since
there is much language to that effect in the Hardenburgh case.
However, it would seem more probable that a trial court
would rule that the law today is as it was actually expressed in
Fraser v. Clark. The language of the opinion bearing upon this
question of contract interpretation was uniform and unbending
in stating that the contract be specific in indicating the place of
performance. Further, even should a trial court find the Harden-
burgh opinion to be more than the private views of two members
of that Court, still it is doubtful whether much weight would be
laid upon that decision in view of the conflicting language there-
in."
And so it is concluded that the existing law governing which
"See notes 20 through 23, aupra.
10
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contracts are embraced by the second sentence of Section 93-2904
should be determined from the Fraser case itself. But the ques-
tion remains, does the rule of the Fraser case really mean what it
says?
The rule of Fraser can be taken to be that statement quoted
from American Jurisprudence which the majority declares it sub-
scribes to: ". . . Where such a provision is in the nature of an
exception ... it is construed to be applicable only when the con-
tract is by its express terms to be performed in a particular coun-
ty." There are at least four possible interpretations of, or im-
plications from such a rule: (1) that the place for performance
must be stated in so many words; (2) that it must be possible to
imply the place of the performance from the context of the con-
tract ("factual" implication, but not legal implication) ; (3) that
neither of the above are exclusive, but that the nature of the
transaction and the circumstances surrounding its making may
be looked to; or (4) that none of the above are exclusive, but that
legal implication can be made, from statutory and common law
rules for interpretation of contracts generally. (Of course, the
decision makes it clear that only express contracts are contem-
plated by the statute.)
Let us examine those cases to which we are referred in the
decision itself to see if they throw any light upon the matter.
The Montana cases expressly revived in Fraser v. Clark were
Wallace v. Owsley, McDonnell v. Collins, and Bond v. Hurd.'
Wallace was an action in L. County for goods sold and delivered
at the plaintiff's place of business in that county. The Court
held that there were no allegations in the complaint directed to
provision for place of performance in the oral contract sued upon,
and that, therefore, the contract clause of Section 93-2904 could
not be applied. Surely a necessary implication from that con-
tract was, not that the seller would seek out the buyer for pay-
ment, but that the buyer would, at the store, or in remittance
thereto, pay the price.' Yet the Court found the contract clause
inapplicable.
McDonnell was a suit to recover the amount of an account
claimed to be due and owing from the defendants. The Court
summarily held that the action was of a character requiring it to
'Supra, notes 6, 7, and 8, respectively.
81Such an implication is not necessarily an application of the tender rule.
Cf. Mr. Justice Adair's discussion of the Coburn case, and his illustra-
tion of the over-the-counter sale of goods, in Hardenburgh v. Harden-
burgh (1944) 115 Mont. 469, 488 et seq. 146 P.(2d) 151, 158 et seq.
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be brought where the defendant resided, citing Wallace v. Owsley,
and Yore v. Murphy.'
In Bond the Court held that two of the causes of action were
actions upon open account, and not actions upon express con-
tracts, as contemplated by the contract clause of the venue
statute.
The Fraser case also cited Yore v. Murphy," dignifying the
dictum in that case that the face of the contract must disclose
that it was to be performed in the county in which the action was
commenced.
Reading those Montana cases together, it would seem that
the Court in Fraser v. Clark did indeed mean that the contract
should in express terms indicate the place of performance."
The Colorado case to which reference was given in Fraser v.
Clark was Lamar Alfalfa Milling Co. v. Bishop." That case was
one of a line of Colorado cases, several of which were therein
cited. It will be helpful to examine two of those cited cases, viz:
Brewer v. Gordon,' and People v. District Court of 12th District.'
Brewer is the leading case in Colorado on the subject of
venue of contract actions, and is the basis for the statement in
American Jurisprudence which the majority in the Fraser case
adopted. That was a suit on a sheriff's indemnity bond which
contained no provision making the indemnity payable in any par-
ticular county. The Court held that since such was the case, it
was the privilege of the defndant to have the action tried in the
county of his residence. The decision was based upon an inter-
pretation of the Colorado statute, similar on this point to that of
Montana;' and upon Texas and Iowa cases, in which states, how-
ever, the codes expressly required the naming of a particular
place of performance. Those cited cases required that the instru-
'The court also cited three California cases which, of course, ignored
place of performance because the contract clause of the corresponding
California venue statute (Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 395) was not added
thereto until 1933 (Ch. 744, § 6), STATUTES OF' CALIFORNIA, 1933). This
would indicate the Court was not quite aware of the problem involved.
(1891) 10 Mont. 304, 25 P. 1039.
"Although the Court in Bond v. Hurd declared its holding was not con-
trary to Oels v. Helena and Livingston Smelting and Reduction Co.
(1891) 10 Mont. 524, 26 P. 1000, wherein the place of performance was
found by "necessary implication," yet Oe18 itself was not cited in Fraser,
although it was the first Montana case on the subject.
(1926) 80 Colo. 369, 250 P. 689.
"(1899) 27 Colo. 111, 59 P. 404, 83 Am. St. Rep. 45.
"(1923) 74 Colo. 121, 218 P. 1047.
"'. ... Actions upon contracts may be tried in the county in which the
contract was to be performed .... ", Colo. Stat. Ann. 1935, Rules of Civ.
Proc., C.11, Rule 98 (c).
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ment in writing "plainly provide" or "the terms of the contract
sued upon" indicate the place of performance.
People v. District Court of 12th District was an action for
the price of two carloads of potatoes. The Court held that
".. . No place of performance by defendant seems to have been
specified expressly, and, therefore, discussion of place of per-
formance is irrelevant. .... "
Finally, Lamar itself was an action for the alleged failure
to deliver under a contract for the sale and delivery of an electric
motor. It was held that the contract clause of the Colorado
Statute refers to contracts which by their terms are to be per-
formed at a particular place, citing the above discussed cases.
So, it would seem from those Colorado decisions that the
Lamar Court thought the law to be as was paraphrased there-
from in the Fraser case, that ". . . The language 'the county in
which the contract is to be performed,' refers only to contracts
which, by their terms, indicate they were to be performed in a
particular county. "
Both, then, the early Montana cases cited in Fraser v. Clark,
and the line of Colorado cases based upon a similar code provi-
sion, would make tenable a conclusion that the rule of the Fraser
case eliminates "necessary implication" as an interpretive rule.'
If necessary implication is out, a fortiori would a considera-
tion of circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract
be excluded. But what about legal implication?
The Montana code provisions for the interpretation of con-
tracts run the course from necessary implication"° to investigating
the state of mind of the promisor.' It seems quite clear that re-
course to such statutes would be repugnant to the rule of Fraser.
Many of those statutes were cited in the Hardenburgh case, but
no mention was made of them in the Fraser case, nor did those
"An explanation of this limitation could lie in a recognition of merit in
Justice Erickson's dissent in Hardenburggh v. Hardenburgh, in which he
said:
"It seems to me that if the majority view is to be adopted it would
have to be limited under the terms of the statute to contracts where
there was an express provision for the place for performance and to go
further and suggest that the place for performance can be determined by
necessary implication is not warranted and clearly when you apply the
latter test of necessary implication might it not be said that this court
has already applied that test when it was held as it has that it must
necessarily be implied that where the contract is silent as to the place
for performance the parties necessarily contracted with the statutes in
mind and the place for performance was, in effect, placed in the con-
tract for this reason?"
-R.C.M. 1947 § 13-707.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 13-715.
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early Montana cases make use of them. As for the tender rule,
there was clear opportunity to apply it in the Wallace and Mc-
Donnell cases, as well as in several of the Colorado cases discussed
supra, yet it was ignored.
So, in conclusion, it would seem that Fraser v. Clark would
confine the application of the contract clause to express contracts
which by express terms provide for a place of performance other
than the defendant's residence, and that necessary implication,
surrounding circumstances, and legal implication are ruled out.
Before the value and effect of such a rule are appraised, an ex-
amination of the word "performance" would be in order.
There are at least two situations to consider in regard to per-
formance: where the contract is bilateral, and where there is
more than one place of performance by one of the parties to the
contract.
Where the contract is bilateral, which performance is looked
to, the plaintiff's or the defendant's? Fraser v. Clark itself
answered that question when it declared that since the contract
"... does not designate the place of payment" (emphasis ours),
it did not come within the provisions of the second sentence of
Section 93-2904." Also, an earlier Montana case decided the
question directly. In Colbert Drug Co. v. Electrical Products
Consolidated" it was held that the place of performance of the
obligation imposed upon the defendant, the breach of which was
the ground for the plaintiff's complaint, was the place of per-
formance in question. Most of the Montana cases have either
assumed this to be the rule," or else the contracts sued upon were
of a unilateral character.
There remains the question which is raised when there is
more than one place of performance on the part of the defendant;
as, for example, where he contracts to deliver goods to more than
one county. Considering the narrowness of the rule of the Fraser
case, and its underlying principle that the plaintiff must clearly
bring himself within an exception to a strong primary right of the
"Although confusion might result from a comparison of Mr. Chief Justice
Adair's discussion of "payment" in Hardenburgh v. Hardenburgh.
"(1937) 106 Mont. 11, 74 P.(2d) 437, citing State ex rel. Western Acci-
dent & Indemnity Co. v. District Court (1918) 55 Mont. 330, 176 P. 613.
See also Lamar Alfalfa Milling Co. v. Bishop (1926) 80 Colo. 369, 250
P. 689, 690. The Todd case therein cited was one of many Texas cases
touching the point in question.
"See, e.g., Hough v. Rocky Mountain Fire Insurance Co. (1924) 70 Mont.
244, 224 P. 858; Stiemke v. Jankovich (1925) 72 Mont. 363, 233 P. 904;
Silver v. Morin (1925) 74 Mont. 398, 240 P. 825. However, the position
of the Court in the Hardenburgh case on this point is not entirely clear,
and the Oels case seemed to look to the place of the plaintiff's perform-
ance.
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defendant, it would seem the Court would not allow the plaintiff
the liberty of bringing suit in any one of several counties other
than the defendant's residence, nor would it embark upon the
often impossible task of determining in which county was the
major part of the total performance to be executed. It is more
probable that the Court would conclude that in such a situation
the "exception" does not apply, and would place emphasis upon
the fact that the statute reads, "... Actions upon contracts may
be tried in the county in which the contract was to be per-
formed. . . ." The precise point has not been before the Supreme
Court of Montana.
III.
Insofar as Fraser v. Clark may well have decided that there
is more than one proper county for the trial of a contract action,
and left the burden on the defendant to support a change of
venue, it would seem a fairly clear and workable decision, al-
though, as noted supra, there is that modicum of doubt on both
points with which to contend.
But the rule laid down as to which contracts are within the
purview of the second sentence of Section 93-2904 poses the dif-
ficulty, treated at some length above, as to whether that rule can
be taken at its face value. Further, even if the rule be clearly
that only contracts which in express terms indicate the place of
performance are affected by that second sentence, still, it seems
to be difficult to keep the rule so limited.
Witness first the Hardenburgh case. Although the Court
there several times implied that the rule was limited to contracts
with express terms in regard to performance, yet it also stated
the rule as including necessary implication. And the opinion
seemed them to find it necessary to go further and bring in legal
implication, with the notable exception of the tender rule, and
even there it invoked a tender rule of a sort in its illustration of
an over-the-counter sale of goods. The opinion also talked of
looking to the nature of the transaction, and to the circumstances
surrounding its making.
Further, states whose statutes were narrower on their face
than that of Montana have included at least "necessary implica-
tion" in the rule. Atlas Acceptance Corporation v. Pratt" was a
Utah case decided under a statute which provided, in part:
"When the defendant has contracted in writing to perform an
obligation in a particular county of the state and resides in an-
other county, an action on such contract . . . may be . . . tried in
(1935) 85 Utah 352, P.(2d) 710.
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the county where such obligation is to be performed or in which
the defendant resides. . . . "" The entire decision was devoted to
the question of whether this provision included "necessary im-
plication" from the contract, the Court after examining many
cases deciding that it did.
Until 1935, the corresponding Texas statute read, "If a per-
son has contracted in writing to perform an obligation in a par-
ticular county, suit may be brought either in such county or
where the defendant has his domicile.""'
The now amended statute reads, "If a person has contracted
in writing to perform an obligation in a praticular county, ex-
pressly naming such county, or a definite place therein, by such
writing, suit upon or by reason of such obligation may be brought
against him, either in such county or where the defendant has his
domicile. "  (Italics supplied).
The preamble to the amending Act showed the intended
change: "An act amending subdivision 5 . . . by distinctly
specifying that the county for the performance of the obligation
which is involved in the suit, must be named by the writing ex-
pressly." The emergency clause added as a reason for the
amendment, "... the unsettled state of the law as to the contract
clause of the venue statute.'
Prior to this amendment, the Texas courts had found it con-
venient and desirable to have recourse, not only to "necessary im-
plication," but also to parol proof, legal implication, and ex-
traneous evidence,' the while rooting their decisions in the ground
that the defendant has" . . . the inestimable right . . . to be sued
in the place of his residence.. .. "' And so the Texas Legislature
thought it necessary to make the statute even more explicit than
it had been.
Likewise, it is most probable that before the law in Montana
on this subject becomes settled there will be required a more
definitive decision, or a legaslative amendment. If this be true,
then it is in order for the writer to set forth his views as to what
would be a salutary turn of the law for Montana.
-R.S. Utah 1933, § 104-4-4.
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (1935), Art. 1995, § 5.
'"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, Supp. 1947), Art. 1995, § 5.
'9TEx. LAWS 1935, Ch. 213, § 1.
5°e.g., Allison & Sons v. Hamic (1924 260 S.W. 1037, (Tex. Comm. App.
1924) ; Marcus v. Armer (1928) 117 Tex. 368, 5 S.W. (2d) 960; Cities'
Service Oil Co. v. Brown (1930) 119 Tex. 242, 27 S.W. (2d) 115; Oliver
v. Gallagher (1930) 119 Tex. 178, 26 S.W. (2d) 903.
5'Todd v. W. E. Jamar Seed Co. (1923) 252 S.W. 256, 257.
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It appears to the writer that there are three practical choices
for the Montana Court as to the future direction of the law of
venue for contract actions. The first is to particularize the rule
of Fraser v. Clark in substantially the same way the Texas Legis-
lature has particularized its venue statute.
The second choice would be a compromise solution. That is
that the plaintiff has the option to sue either where the contract
was to be performed, or at the defendant's residence, but that the
ordinary rules for the interpretation of contracts could be ap-
plied where the intended place for performance by the defendant
is not clear.
The third alternative would be a return to the rule of the
Interstate Lumber Ca. case and the line of cases following that
decision.
With these alternatives in mind, let us look at this concept,
''venue," to see if it embraces any fundamental principles which
will be of help in the choice. Professor Foster well summarizes
the common law on the subject:
"Numerous standard works (citing treatises) trace
the relation between the rules of venue and the develop-
ment of jury trial, and show how the fact-reporting
function of the jury originally made it inevitable that
the jurors come from the place where the facts at issue
arose, thus making all actions local;... how the require-
ment of a local venue gradually relaxed with the change
of the jury to a fact-trying body;. . . how the distinction
between local and transitory actions came to turn on
whether the court would permit the allegation that a
particular event happened in one place, to wit in a total-
ly different place, and how this left the plaintiff with
the prima facie power of designating any county in Eng-
land as the place for trial of a transitory action.''
And so it would seem, rather than there being a primary right in
the defendant, that at the common law there is a primary right in
the plaintiff to exercise a free election as to place of trial when
the action is of transitory nature.
Professor Sunderland has stated:
"Obviously there is no essential jurisdictional mat-
ter involved in the question; of venue, and the only con-
sideration that ought ever to control is convenience ...
'Foster, Place of Trial-Interstate Application of Intrastate Methods of
Adjustment, 44 HAzv. L. Rgv. 41, 43 (1930). See also the detailed study
of the history of common law venue in Blume, Place of Trial of Civil
Cases, 48 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1949). Also see 56 AM. JuiL, Venue §§ 2 and
3; and 1 CHITTY'S PLEADINGS (16th Ed. 1882), § 280, p. 360.
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the points of incidence of the principle of convenience
would be: (1) the convenience of the plaintiff; (2) the
convenience of the defendant; and, (3) the convenience
of the witnesses. Each of these has exerted an influence
in the framing of rules of venue, and since they are often
mutually antagonistic, the results have been confus-
ing. "' (Emphasis ours)
Professor George Neff Stevens, in an exhaustive study of
venue statutes in the United States today, speaking of the right
of the plaintiff to elect the place of trial says:
"... the broad choice of venue under the transitory
action concept of the English common law has been sub-
stantially reduced by positive legislation.... The most
common provision today, and the basic one, appears to be
venue based upon the reidence of the defendant. "'"
But, although Professor Stevens finds venue based upon the resi-
dence of the defendant to be the most common provision, his
rationale therefor is not a fundamental right inhering in the de-
fendant, but rather convenience to the defendant. And predi-
cated upon the same basis, convenience, does he find venue pro-
visions allowing the action to be brought in the county where the
cause of action arose, or where the plaintiff resides. Like Pro-
fessor Sunderland, Professor Stevens rationalizes the venue
statutes in terms of convenience of the parties, and of conveni-
ence of witnesses.
The writer would presume to add-" and certainty of pro-
cedure. "
Returning, then, to the three alternatives for the Montana
venue problem, how does the rule of Fraser v. Clark appear in
the light of the above-considered principles? It is submitted that
it would be unnecessary and unreasonable to subject the clause of
the venue statute to further judicial limitation, with all the dan-
ger and uncertainty concomitant thereto. That such a course
bears little chance for success can be prophesied from a look at
Colorado, where the law on venue of contract actions stays broken
to lead, but no more ;' and at Texas, where a legislative amend-
ment finally became necessary. That such a course is unneces-
sary would seem a proper conclusion from the examination,
supra, of the common law; and from the examination of modern
'Sunderland, The Provisions Relating to Trial Practice in the New IIU-
nois Civil Practice Act, 1 U. CHI. L. REv., 188, 192 (1933).
'Stevens, Venue Statutes: Diagnosis and Proposed Cure, 49 MICH. L. REV.
307, 315 (1951).
See E. F. Gobatti Engineering & M. Corporation v. Oliver Well Works
(1943) 111 Colo. 193, 139 P.(2d) 269.
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venue statutes, wherein rules of thumb attempting to make an
initial balance of the relative conveniences of the parties and the
witnesses are the prime considerations. If, in Montana, there be
an "ancient and valuable" right in the defndant to have suit
against him tried in his home county, the consideration of venue,
supra, would yield the conclusion that it must needs have de-
veloped during the four year interim between the enactment of
the Civil Practice Act of 1867 and the enactment of the Codified
Statutes of 1871.
It is pertinent at this point to observe the Montana code
section on place of trial of actions in justices' courts R.C.M. 1947.
Section 93-16601. Although this section gives the plaintiff an
option in laying the venue it is mandatory in providing for find-
ing the place of performance by operation of law in the absence
of a special contract to the contrary, and it is expressly applica-
ble to implied contracts. Should we conclude that only defend-
ants who are being sued for an amount exceeding $300.00 possess
the fundamental right to be sued at home with the corollary of
stringent construction of any exceptions to that right?
It is further pertinent to observe that although the law of
California continues to assert the "ancient and valuable right"
doctrine,' the California Legislature in 1933 added to the general
venue section of their code, which prior thereto had no contract
exception, a contract clause substantially the same as that quoted,
supra, from the Montana justice court venue provision." Indeed,
the note of the California Code Commissioners states:
"The provision specifying the county in which a
contract is to be performed as a proper county, is taken
from the former section 832-which is applicable only to
justices' courts. Its inclusion in the amended section
would make it applicable to all courts. It seems a proper
provision, which should be made generally applicable,
liberalizing the rules, somewhat, in plaintiff's favor."
(Emphasis ours).
So California, while still choosing to favor the convenience of the
defendant generally, recognizes in fact, if not in words, an
equality in the convenience of witnesses and trial. Is there a
sound basis for saying the Montana Legislature has done less?
And if the law will have recourse to the nature of the agree-
ment, the circumstances surrounding its making, and legal im-
plication in considering the place of performance and the alleged
bSee Goossen v. Clifton (1946) 75 Cal. App. (2d) 44, 170 P.(2) 104.
14Ch. 744, § 6, STATUTES OF CALIFORNIA, 1933.
'Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 1953, § 395, Code Commissioners' Note 2.
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breach thereof in the trial on the merits, why should it not be al-
lowed such aids in attempting to approximate convenience of trial
at the outset?
The writer, then, would submit that further judicial limita-
tion along the lines of Fraser v. Clark would not have a sound
basis, and that it would bear little hope for a successful stabiliza-
tion of the Montana law on the venue of contract actions.
The second of the three practical choices suggested, supra,
is a compromise solution whereby the plaintiff would be allowed
an election between the county of the defendant's residence and
the county in which the contract was to be performed; but im-
plied contracts would be included, and ordinary rules of contract
interpretation might be applied to determine the place of per-
formance, as under the Interstate Lumber Co. case. The burden
of proof would remain on the defendant, following the Courtney
and Johnson cases.
This would seem to affect the intent of the Legislature as to
which contracts are embraced by the second sentence, as dis-
cussed supra. As to the holding in the Interstate case, that
''may " means "must," the statute does, after all, say "may. '
And an election on the part of the plaintiff is provided for in
the venue statutes of several of the states.'
Such a compromise solution would seem to be a straight-
forward and reasonable interpretation of the language of Section
93-2904 of the Montana Code. It would be harmonious with the
general principles which should underly the regulation of venue,
and with the Model Venue Code developed by Professor Stevens
after extensive study of the problem.'
However, though it would seem most proper, both in reason
and tradition, to take our venue statute on its face and so con-
strue it, still there is another factor to be considered-certainty
of settled law. That brings us to the third alternative, namely, a
return to the rule of the Interstate Lumber Co. case.
The only difference between the law under the Interstate
case and the solution posed above is that with the former there is
but one place of trial for a contract action-the county in which
the defendant was to have performed. Although at the common
law the plaintiff had plenary discretion in regard to place of trial
when the action was transitory, under the modern rationale of
'See Horkan, The Place of Trial of Contract and Tort Actions Under the
Montana Venue Statutes, 10 MONT. L. Rzv. 83, 94 (1949).
we.g., Illinois, Colorado, California, and Texas. See also, Model Venue
Code, infra, note 61.
"tStevens, Venue Statutes: Diagnosis and Proposed Cure, 49 MIcH. L. Ruv.
307, 332 (1951).
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convenience there is no necessity of ordaining such a power of
election with a quality of sacredness. The Interstate rule certain-
ly subserves the convenience of trial and witnesses, which would
seem to be the reason for the contract and tort clause. And it
goes without saying that it follows along with what would appear
to be the policy behind the first sentence of 93-2904--to restrict
the possible oppressive behavior of the plaintiff, who controls the
institution of the suit.
But the real argument for a return to the Interstate rule is
that it has been a workable rule, and a rule well-understood for
many years by the bench and bar of Montana. After all, cer-
tainty is of prime importance in the law of procedure. And the
Interstate rule had the certainty of twenty-six years of case law
behind it before it was overturned.
True, this alternative is vulnerable to the same objection as
is the alternative first discussed-judicial legislation. But the
Interstate decision enjoyed the curative effect of time and the
acquiescence of thirteen regular sessions of the Legislature.
For these reasons, the writer submits that a return to the rule
under the Interstate Lwmber Co. line of cases would be a salu-
tary turn of the Montana decisional law concerning venue of con-
tract actions.
That rule, again, is that the "may'" of the second sentence of
Section 93-2904 is to be taken as "must," resulting in but one
place of trial of actions on tort and contract; that the contract
clause applies to all contracts, express or implied; that the ordi-
nary rules for the interpretation of contracts will be applied if
the contract itself does not evidence the place of performance in-
tended by the parties, including the tender rule; that the burden
of proof is upon the defendant to disclose facts entitling him to
a change of venue; and that it is the performance of the defend-
ant, or part of that performance, which is in the contemplation
of the contract clause, the alleged breach of which gives rise to
the suit.
The choices before the Legislature, of course, are many. It
could reinforce the Court in any of the above-offered alternatives,
or it could enact an entire new venue code, or it could do nothing.
The books are full of suggestions for reforms, sweeping reforms,
of venue statutes, to bring them up to date,' if that should be de-
sired.
Should the Legislature consider the Hardenburgh-Fraser
"See e.g., Langley, A Suggested Revision of the Tea.as Venue Statute, 30
TEx. L. R-v. 547 (1952) ; Stevens, Venue Stactutes: Diagnosis and Pro-
posed Cure, 49 Micn. L. REv. 307 (1951).
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cases as moves in the right direction, then it is suggested that
the contract clause, as amended, of the corresponding Texas
venue statute be looked to.' Since that amendment, the Texas
law on the point seems to have become fairly well established.'
Should the Legislature wish to adopt something similar to
what has been called, supra, the compromise solution, it would
seem in order to word the two sentences of Section 93-2904 in the
alternative; to specifically include all contracts, whether express
or implied; to provide that it is the defendant's performance, or
part of that performance, to which reference is made; and to
provide for either the application of ordinary rules of contract
interpretation, or for a special rule of legal implication. The con-
tract clause of the justices' courts venue statute could serve as a
model.'
But should the Legislature, in the interests of procedural sta-
bility, consider a return to the rule of the Interstate line of cases
desirable, then it is suggested that the contract-tort clause be
placed ahead of the general venue section with the other ex-
ceptions; that the clause specifically include all contracts, ex-
press or implied; that it provide that it is the defendant's per-
formance, or part of that performance, to which reference is
made; and that it provide for either the application of the ordi-
nary rules of contract interpretation, or for a special rule of
legal implication, as in the venue statute for justices' courts.
WILLIAM R. McNAMER.
6Supra, note 48.
"See, e.g., Port Iron & Supply Co. v. Casualty Underwriters (1938) 118
S.W. (2d) 627; Rowan Drilling Co. v. Le Bus et al. (1938) 119 S.W.
(2) 97; Johnston et al. v. Personius (1951) 242 S.W. (2d) 471.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 93-6601.
CREDITORS' CLAIMS IN PROBATE; WHAT CLAIMS
MUST BE FILED WITHIN THE PERIOD OF
THE NON-CLAIMS STATUTE
The Montana non-claim statute applying to the filing of
creditors' claims in probate reads as follows:'
All claims arising upon contracts, whether the same be
due, not due, or contingent, must be presented within the
time limited in the notice, and any claim not so presented
is barred forever; provided, however, that when it is
made to appear by the affidavit of the claimant, to the
satisfaction of the court or judge, that the claimant had
1R.C.M. 1947 §91-2704.
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